The McFadden Act: a look back by Verle B. Johnston
August 19, 1983
Atthis point, the Federal Reserve Board,
which had been sympathetic to branch
banking, reversed its attitude. Although
National Banks constituted the backbone of
the Federal Reserve System, amajorityofthe
Board concluded thatthe best wayto ease
these banks' competitivedisadvantage in
states that permitted state-chartered banks
to branch was notto allowbranchingby
national banks, butto circumscribe branch-
ing by state memberbanks. The chiefadvo-
cateofthisviewwas thenewComptrollerof
the Currency (and Board member), Henry
Dawes, who, in testimonyto Congress, as-
serted that "Branch banking, unless curbed,
will mean the destruction ofthe national
banks and thereby the destruction ofthe
Federal Reserve System..." Consequently,
in a4-3 vote on November 1923, the Board
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In 1922, Congressman Louis T. McFadden
(R-Pa), a former bank President, introduced
a bill that would allow national banks parity
with state banks in establishing branches.
Butthe bill encountered strong opposition
and failed to move. At aboutthe same time,
Comptrollerofthe Currency and Board
member, D.R. Crissinger, became increas-
ingly worried over the c(jmpetitive disad-
vantage placed upon national banks bythe
prohibition on branching. Unsuccessful in
his efforts to get the Congress to adopt
remedial legislation, he issued a rulingthat
national banks could establish agencies,
tellerwindowsoradditional offices within
the cityofthe parent bank forthe purpose
ofaccepting deposits and cashihg checks,
providedthatstate banks were permitted by
state law to operate branches in that state.
Crissinger contended that the additional
offices were notbranches inasmuch as they
were notauthorized to make loans, a ruling
that triggered astorm ofprotest, includinga
blisteringanti-branchingresolution adopted
by the ABA.
The recent manifestations are propelled by
the inexorable march oftechnological and
marketdevelopments that have steadily
undermined barriers to interstate banking
per se. This "Look Back" is designed to pro-
vide a historical perspective to the debate
that re$ulted in the effective preclusion
ofinterstate branchingbycommercial banks
in the McFadden Act.
Two concerns, therefore, shaped the debate
over the McFadden-Pepper Act: the poten-
tial anti-competitive effects ofbranch bank-
ing and the dual system ofregulating banks.
These continueto influencediscussions of
branchingderegulation and, now, just as
before, theactionsofstategovernments may
force the hand ofCongress.
Some background
In 1910, California and eleven other states
explicitly permitted at.least some intra-state
branching while ninestate specifically pro-
hibited it. By 1924, the numberofstates
permittingsomeformofbranchinghad risen
to 18, while the number prohibiting italso
rose to 18.The ambivalencetoward branch-
ing represented by these statistics prevailed
on the national level as well, although with
the added issue ofinequitable treatmentof
state-chartered and national banks. Nation-
al banks, unliketheirstate-chartered
counterparts, had never been permitted to
open branches. The National BankingActof
1863 made no mention ofbranch banking
whatsoever, and this omission was con- •
strued by the Comptroller, the Treasury and
the Supreme Court as a prohibition.
It has been 56 years since the Congress
enacted the 1927 McFadden-PepperAct,
which included an implicit prohibition of
interstate branching bycommercial banks.
Manyofthe arguments that surfaced during
the five year debate overthe Act and subse-
quentkeyamendmentsare again appearing.
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This remarkable inducement to non-
membership by state banks in states with
liberal branching lawswas roundly assailed
by Vice Chairman Edmund Platt in the first
dissentingopinion ofrecord in the Board's
ten year history. Platt notonly questioned
thelegalityofthe resolution butsharplycrit-
icized the majority's actions to discourage,
rather than encourage, branch banking. He
cited the great success ofbranch banking in
California (where A.P. Giannini's Bank of
Italy then counted 61 branches serving 42
communities) and branch banking's partic-
ularcontribution tothe agricuItural sector
ofthe Golden State's economy.
But notwithstanding Platt's strong dissent,
Comptroller Dawes had his deputydraft a
bill which generallyembodied the Board's
anti-branching resolution. The measure was
introduced intothe House BankingCommit-
tee in 1924byCongressman T. McFadden.
In addition to various provisions that
broadened the deposit and lending powers
ofnational banks, Section 9 stipulated that
any state bankenteringthe System after
enactment could not retain its existing state-
wide branches, and that while present state
member banks could retain all existing
branches, they could notestablish addi-
tional branches outside their home city.
National banks received severely limited
branching authority in their homecities
based on the size ofthe cities' population,
but in all cases, branching authority was
predicated uponthe grantofsuch authority
to state banks by state law.
McFadden, meet A.P. Giannini
In the summer of 1924, Congressman
McFadden visited California and in asubse-
quent letterto A.P. Giannini, characterized
the state's branch banks as "splendidly
managed" and serving the public needs "in
a thoroughly bankable way." But his views
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had noeffectupon asizeable majorityofhis
Banking Committee colleagues, including
Congressman HullofChicago, whosecured
the adoption ofmore restrictive ABA-
endorsed branching amendments when the
biII again came up forconsideration. These
included stipulations designed to head-off
branching by any national or state member
banks in the states which mightpermit
branching in the future.
The amended bill passed the Houseon
January24, 1925, butintheSenate, encoun-
tered the strongoppositionofSenatorCarter
Glass, the Virginia Democratwho had been
the principal authorofthe Federal Reserve
Act and who was a staunch advocateof .
branch banking. The BankingCommittee
struck the Hull amendments, and the bill
lapsed upon adjournment. However, like
Dracula rising from his coffin, the bill was
notcompletely dead.
Trying again
When the 69th Congress convened in
December 1925, Congressman McFadden
re-introduced his bill. It again passed the
Housewith the Hull amendments only
aga"in toencountertheoppositionofSenator
Glass and the Senate BankingCommittee.
In the meantime, Comptroller Henry Dawes
resigned and was replaced by Joseph W.
Mcintosh, a staunch advocate ofbranch
bankingafteravisittoCalifornia in 1924. As
a result, majority sentimenton the Federal
Reserve Board again shifted in favorof
branching by national banks. Moreover, the
prospects ofthe McFadden bill, even with
corefeaturesthatsignificantlyenhanced the
depositand lending powers ofnational
banks, had notforestalled a substantial shift
from national to state charter-166 in the
previous year alone.
In any case, Glass and the Senate Banking
Committee again rejected the Hull amend-
ments in favor ofthe original Section 9 pro-
visions, but this timethey allowed any state
banks subsequently joiningthe System toMONETARY POLICY OBJECTIVES
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retain any branches acquired priorto the
law's enactment. The bill passed, but subse-
quently died in Conference Committee after
bitter wrangling with the House members,
who insisted that the highly restrictive Hull
amendments be restored.
Take that sir..,
When the Congress reconvened in Decem-
. ber, Congressman McFadden once again
submitted his bill (H.R. 2) withoutthe Hull
amendments, and it passed the House on
January 24, 1927. Whathad helped turn the
tide was the growing numberofbank fail-
ures (almost 1,000 in the previous year, and
almost3,900since 1921),ofwhichtheover-
whelming majority were unitbanks.
Influen'ced in part by this consideration and
by the more positive thrust ofSenator Glass'
amendments as compared with the highly
restrictive Hull amendments, and perhaps
influenced as well bythe sunny Los Angeles
climatewhere itwasholdingits convention,
the ABA voted to endorse the revised bill.
Nevertheless, the measure nowencoun-
tered stiffopposition in the Senate where
Senator Glass and Montana's Burton K.
Wheeler (D), a strong opponentofbranch
banking, at one pointescalated their rhet-
oricintonearfisticuffs. In thefaceofathreat-
ened filibuster by Senator Wheeler and the
bill'sopponents, closure on debatewas
invoked-thefirst time ever in the historyof
theSenate on adomestic issue-andthebill
was passed. The McFadden-Pepper Actwas
signed into law by President Coolidge on
February 25.
Banking Actof 1933
Itremained forthe Glass-Steagall Banking
Actof1933torectify thedisparatetreatment
ofnational and state member banks (and of
both in relation to non-memberbanks), The
circumstanceswhichgave risetothe change
involved nothing less than the collapse of
thenation'seconomy in 1929. Betweenthat
year and 1933 there were some 9,400 bank
failures nationally, the overwhelming
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majority representing unitbanks. By 1932,
23 states permitted branch banking (five
more than in 1923), although 18 still specif-
ically prohibited it. To a considerable
extent, it was the relative strength of
branch banks that inspired the provision
in the BankingActof 1933 amendingthe
McFadden-Pepper Actto allownational
banks to operate branches wherever
permitted state banks by state law.
The liberalized amendmenttothe
McFadden Actand the relatively good per-
formanceofbranch banks inthe Depression
contributed to an increase from 23 in 1932
to35 by 1936 in the numberofbanks allow-
ing at least some branching, and an atten-
dantdrop from 18to 9 in the numberthat
continued specifically to prohibit it.
Past is prologue
Today, 22 states and the DistrictofColum-
bia permit statewide branching and another
18, limited branch banking, whileunit
banking is prevalent in 11 states. Neverthe-
less, the Independent Bankers Association
remains deeply concerned overthe poten-
tial implications for local control and eco-
nomic concentration ofinterstate branching
and banking per se.
In noneofthe states that limitor prohibit
branching by commerc;ial banks are the
same Iimits imposed onthrifts orotherfinan-
cial intermediaries. And loomingeverlarger
in the competition for funds and othertradi-
tional banking-type services are the con-
glomerates, such as Sears-Allstate-Dean
Witter-Coldwell Bankerand Prudential-
Bache, that are notsubject to the various
interstate restrictions ofthe McFadden Act.
Increasingly, it is the burgeoninggrowthof
these entities subjectto yetanothersystem
ofregulation that are calling into question
the usefulness ofthe McFadden Act as an
"umbrella" protecting local banks from the
gales ofinterstate competition.
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Selected Assets and liabilities
LargeCommercial Banks
o ar ercent
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 162,010 - 467 507 0.3
loans(gross, adjusted) - total# 140,816 - 329 - 523 - 0,4
Commercial and industrial 43,715 189 - 825 - 1.9
Real estate 56,265 58 - 1,197 - 2.1
loansto individuals 24,101 0 707 3.0
Securities loans 2,414 - 272 - 376 - 13.5
U.S. Treasury securities* 8,022 - 154 1,783 28.6
Othersecurities* 13,171 16 - 753 - 5,4
Demand deposits - total# 42,777 2,566 2,021 5.0
Demand deposits - adjusted 29,418 540 1,660 6.0
Savings deposits - totalt 66,701 531 35,564 114.2
Time deposits - total# 65,793 28 - 33,835 - 34.0
Individuals, part. & corp. 60,317 180 - 29,882 - 33.1









Member Bank Reserve Position
Extess Reserves (+ljDeficiency (-)
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* Excludes trading account securities.
# indudesitemsnotshown separately.
t Includes MoneyMarket DepositAccounts:, Super-NOW accounts, and NOW accounts,
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